Former Auditor-General Daniel Yao Domelevo has criticized the scope of accountability in the Strategic Mobilisation Limited scandal, arguing that more than six persons should face corruption charges for their roles in what he termed a deliberately crafted scheme to defraud the state. His assessment, delivered during a TV3 Key Points interview on Saturday, November 1, 2025, suggests the Office of the Special Prosecutor may be stopping short of full accountability.
The OSP announced on Thursday, October 30, 2025, that it would charge six individuals by the end of November with corruption and corruption-related offences stemming from the controversial GRA revenue assurance contracts. Those named include former Finance Minister Ken Ofori-Atta, his Chef de Cabinet Ernest Akore, former GRA Commissioner-Generals Emmanuel Kofi Nti and Ammishaddai Owusu-Amoah, former Customs Commissioners Isaac Crentsil and Kwadwo Damoah.
But Domelevo indicated he’s not satisfied with limiting accountability to these six officials. Speaking on the same program where he condemned Public Accounts Committee processes as wasteful theater, the former Auditor-General suggested that a procurement irregularity of this magnitude typically involves more players than those officially charged. His comments raise questions about whether political considerations or evidentiary limitations are constraining the scope of prosecutions.
Special Prosecutor Kissi Agyebeng’s investigation concluded there was no genuine need for contracting SML for the work it purported to perform. The company, barely four months old when first submitted to the Public Procurement Authority in 2017, had been rejected several times for lacking necessary capacity to undertake revenue assurance functions. Despite those rejections, SML was later awarded contracts to perform transaction audits and external price verification services.
The OSP will seek to recover GH¢125 million from SML by way of disgorgement of unjust enrichment, representing overpayments for services that were either substandard, minimally performed, or not rendered at all. President John Dramani Mahama has already directed Finance Minister Cassiel Ato Forson to terminate all existing SML contracts following the OSP’s damning findings.
Domelevo’s suggestion that more than six people should be held accountable touches on a broader question about how corruption networks operate in Ghana’s public sector. Complex procurement schemes typically involve multiple actors at different levels, from those who initiate questionable contracts to those who approve them, implement them, and benefit from them. Limiting prosecutions to six individuals might miss accomplices who played supporting but still criminal roles.
The investigation revealed that SML received payments from GRA without submitting invoices backed by verified reports as required by procedure. This payment structure created room for free and undeserved transfers of public funds, resulting in significant financial losses to the state. Such a system doesn’t emerge accidentally; it requires coordination among multiple officials willing to bypass normal controls.
Isaac Crentsil’s dual role as both a former Customs Commissioner and current General Manager of SML represents an obvious conflict of interest. He was in a position to influence decisions while serving GRA and then directly benefited from those decisions after joining SML. But conflicts of interest rarely exist in isolation. Others must have known about Crentsil’s transition from regulator to beneficiary and chose not to object or report it.
Kwadwo Damoah, another former Customs Commissioner now serving as Member of Parliament for Jaman South, similarly occupied positions where he could shape procurement decisions that benefited SML. His continued presence in Parliament despite facing corruption charges highlights the political protection that can shield implicated officials from immediate consequences.
The OSP’s investigation found that SML’s involvement in revenue assurance operations was based on automatic payments detached from performance. The company failed to provide verifiable reports to justify the large sums received from GRA, yet payments continued for years. That suggests multiple levels of administrative approval where officials either actively participated in the fraud or negligently failed to perform basic oversight functions.
Agyebeng noted that SML had no proven record of technical capability, financial strength, or experience when approved in 2017. The Public Procurement Authority rejected the company several times before eventually approving it. What changed between those rejections and final approval? Who intervened to overcome PPA’s reservations? Those questions point to additional actors who may have facilitated SML’s improper selection.
The Special Prosecutor commended GRA for terminating SML’s transaction audit and external price verification contracts in November 2024, describing the company’s performance as “classless non-performance.” But termination came only after extensive public pressure and media scrutiny. Officials who allowed the arrangement to persist despite obvious underperformance for years before termination might also bear responsibility.
Domelevo’s critique reflects his experience conducting forensic audits during his tenure as Auditor-General. He understands that procurement fraud typically involves chains of complicity, not just headline names. Board members who approved questionable contracts, technical evaluators who overlooked obvious deficiencies, finance officials who processed irregular payments, and supervisors who ignored red flags all contribute to systemic corruption.
The investigation revealed that SML’s monthly audit reports were unreliable, its metering systems unsuitable for use at several petroleum depots, and it couldn’t integrate its operations with existing GRA systems. Yet the company continued receiving substantial payments. Someone had to be signing off on those payments despite the company’s obvious inability to deliver contracted services.
Ken Ofori-Atta’s fugitive status adds another dimension to the case. He was first identified as a suspect in January 2025, declared a fugitive in February after failing to honour OSP summonses, and had his fugitive status reinstated in June after again failing to appear despite promises from his lawyers. The OSP has indicated it will pursue extradition while maintaining the Interpol Red Notice. His flight suggests consciousness of guilt and raises questions about whether others involved might also attempt to evade justice.
The OSP disagreed with several conclusions in KPMG’s audit report on SML, particularly regarding accountability, performance, and value for money. Agyebeng said KPMG’s report was “placatory in material respects,” suggesting it attempted to sanitize SML’s role by ignoring the company’s lack of independent audit tools and its redundancy alongside existing systems like ICUMS and ERDMS. If KPMG’s report was indeed compromised, who influenced that outcome?
Agyebeng stated there was no causal relationship between SML’s operations and reported improvements in petroleum sector revenue. Those gains were largely attributed to macroeconomic factors, increased compliance due to enhanced monitoring from existing GRA systems, and not SML’s contribution. Yet someone must have been crafting narratives that credited SML for improvements it didn’t cause, potentially to justify continued payments.
The contracts allegedly bypassed key regulations under the Public Financial Management Act, 2016 and the Public Procurement Act, 2003. Circumventing two major pieces of legislation requires coordination among multiple officials who understand those laws exist but choose to ignore them. Legal advisors, procurement officers, and finance personnel would all have encountered these violations at various stages.
Domelevo’s call for charging more than six people aligns with his broader critique of Ghana’s accountability system. He has argued that insufficient deterrence allows public officials to abuse funds with impunity. Limiting prosecutions to a small circle of high-profile officials while ignoring accomplices and enablers sends a message that only those at the very top face consequences, which might actually encourage lower-level participation in future schemes.
The political economy of corruption investigations often constrains prosecutorial scope. Going after too many officials risks overwhelming the justice system, generating political backlash, and complicating trials by involving numerous defendants with potentially conflicting defenses. But those practical considerations shouldn’t preclude charging everyone for whom sufficient evidence exists.
It’s also possible that the OSP is pursuing a strategic approach, starting with the most senior officials and potentially using their prosecutions to develop evidence against additional defendants. Plea bargains or cooperation agreements with lower-level officials might reveal involvement by others not yet charged. But Domelevo’s public statement suggests skepticism about whether that expansion will actually occur.
The SML scandal represents one of the most significant corruption cases in recent Ghanaian history. A company with no track record, repeatedly rejected by procurement authorities, somehow secured lucrative contracts to perform services it couldn’t actually deliver, resulting in massive payments from state coffers. That outcome required failures and complicity at multiple institutional levels.
Board members who should have questioned the procurement, auditors who should have flagged irregular payments, supervisors who should have demanded performance evidence, and political officials who should have responded to early warnings all bear varying degrees of responsibility. Whether they face criminal charges or merely administrative sanctions depends on evidence linking them to knowing participation in the scheme.
Domelevo’s intervention highlights a tension in corruption prosecutions between achieving quick, high-profile convictions and pursuing comprehensive accountability. The six officials named by the OSP represent the most senior figures directly involved in approving and implementing SML contracts. Charging them sends a strong signal about accountability at the top. But if others played essential supporting roles and escape consequences, the deterrent effect diminishes.
The former Auditor-General has consistently advocated for aggressive use of accountability mechanisms, including surcharges, disallowances, and prosecutions. His willingness to publicly question whether the OSP is going far enough reflects his belief that Ghana’s corruption problem requires more comprehensive responses than selective prosecutions of a few high-profile officials.
Whether additional charges eventually emerge will depend partly on evidence developed during the initial prosecutions and partly on political will to pursue accountability beyond the most obvious targets. For now, Domelevo has put the OSP on notice that at least one respected voice in Ghana’s anti-corruption community believes six prosecutions fall short of what the SML scandal demands.
