Policy paper on safeguarding the consumer rights on digital platforms

By Ernest Yaw OSEI

This writer holds a Master of Laws in Corporate and Commercial Law from the University of Ghana School of Law

Executive Summary

Digital platforms in Ghana and across Africa have transformed markets, enhanced convenience and expanded consumer choice. Yet, many rely on opaque algorithms, exploitative contracts and unchecked data practices that hinder competition and expose consumers to unfair terms.

This policy paper critically assesses these anti-competitive and consumer-rights abuses, identifies gaps in existing legal and institutional frameworks, and recommends pragmatic reforms.

Key proposals include amending the Competition Act 2010 to cover digital-market conduct explicitly; strengthening the Consumer Protection Act 2012 by mandating clear, accessible platform terms; empowering the Data Protection Act 2012 with algorithmic-transparency obligations; and establishing a dedicated Digital Platforms Regulatory Authority.

Effective enforcement will require inter-agency coordination, capacity building within the Competition and Consumer Protection Commission and Data Protection Commission, and stakeholder engagement to ensure inclusive, transparent digital markets.

Introduction

Over the past decade, digital platforms ranging from ride-hailing and e-commerce marketplaces to fintech services have proliferated in Ghana and beyond. These platforms promise efficiency gains, broader access to goods and services and new income streams for entrepreneurs.

Nonetheless, their operational models often center on network-effects-driven market dominance, algorithmic gatekeeping and the commoditization of personal data.

Such characteristics can undermine fair competition and erode consumer rights unless checked by robust regulation.^[1]Governments and regulators must therefore reconcile the twin goals of fostering innovation and safeguarding consumers in a rapidly evolving digital ecosystem.

This paper offers a detailed analysis of prevailing market abuses and prescribes legal and institutional reforms for Ghana’s digital-economy governance.

Background: Legal and Institutional Frameworks

Ghana’s principal competition statute, the Competition Act 2010 (Act 798), prohibits agreements that appreciably prevent, restrict or distort competition and abuse of dominant position.^[2]

The Consumer Protection Act 2012 (Act 747) secures consumers against unfair terms, false representations and exploitative practices.^[3] Meanwhile, the Data Protection Act 2012 (Act 843) safeguards personal data processing, mandating lawful, transparent and purpose-limited use of information.^[4]

In addition, the African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection (the “Malabo Convention”, 2014) provides a continental framework for data privacy and cybersecurity.^[5] Despite these instruments, digital-market challenges persist: competition law predates platform-specific abuses; consumer protection rules lack digital-tailored provisions; and data-protection enforcement remains nascent.

Assessment ofAnti-Competitive Practices

Digital platform operators routinely exploit the inherent advantages of network effects and the vast troves of user data they collect to solidify and expand their market dominance. Network effects mean that as more users join and engage with a platform, its value grows exponentially encouraging even more users to flock to it and making it exceedingly difficult for newcomers to gain traction.

An especially pervasive tactic is “tying” and “bundling” of services. For example, many ride-hailing companies only allow their most generous promotional discounts or loyalty rewards when customers pay through the platform’s own digital wallet.

This not only discourages payments via third-party providers but also channels user behavior exclusively into the platform’s ecosystem, effectively shutting out alternative payment services and bundling financial services with core transportation offerings.

Similarly, leading e-commerce marketplaces frequently insert “most-favored-nation” (MFN) clauses into their merchant agreements. These clauses mandate that vendors cannot list a product for a lower price on any other website or physical outlet, ensuring the platform always boasts the cheapest available price.

By enforcing MFN clauses, platforms eliminate merchants’ ability to compete on price in other channels, thereby foreclosing potential rival marketplaces and limiting consumer choice.

Beyond contractual restrictions, platforms wield exclusive data-sharing agreements that lock up crucial transactional and behavioral insights, leaving new entrants without the raw material needed to understand market dynamics or target customers effectively.

This data exclusivity creates a formidable barrier to entry: without comparable analytics, startups cannot develop competitive pricing models, tailor marketing campaigns, or optimize user experience.

Compounding these structural impediments is algorithmic manipulation. Platforms control the search, recommendation, and ranking algorithms that determine which products, services, or drivers appear most prominently. When operators favor their own listings or those of partners who pay for preferential placement competitors suffer severe visibility constraints.

Even objectively superior offerings can remain buried under algorithmic biases. Regulatory authorities, accustomed to policing overt price-fixing or cartel behavior, often lack clear legal mandates or technical expertise to deem such algorithmic self-preferencing and data-driven exclusion as outright abuses of dominance under section 45 of the Competition Act 2010. Consequently, these subtle but powerful strategies persist, entrenching incumbent platforms and stifling innovation.^[6]

Assessment of Consumer-Rights Abuses

On the consumer side, digital platforms regularly embed one-sided contract terms into standard form agreements that effectively transfer almost all operational and financial risks onto users, leaving them with little room for recourse.

These contracts almost invariably include unilateral variation clauses enabling platforms to change service fees, subscription rates, privacy policies or user obligations at their sole discretion, often without issuing clear, prior notice or obtaining genuine user consent.

Such clauses permit sudden hikes in commission charges for merchants, unexpected surcharges for end-users, or the retroactive introduction of data-sharing provisions all of which can catch consumers and small businesses off guard.

This practice stands in direct violation of section 17 of the Consumer Protection Act 2012, which deems any contractual term that creates a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations to be void and unenforceable.

In parallel, platforms routinely engage in opaque data-collection tactics ranging from continuous location tracking and device fingerprinting to in-depth behavioral profiling based on clickstreams and purchase history—without securing properly informed consent or offering granular opt-out mechanisms.

Users are frequently presented with dense, jargon-filled privacy notices that obscure the full extent of data harvesting and the myriad ways in which their personal information may be combined, analyzed or monetized. This lack of transparency directly undermines the core tenets of the Data Protection Act 2012, which insists on lawful, fair and transparent processing of personal data.

Compounding these issues, the track record of the Data Protection Commission indicates that most consumer complaints against platform operators lead to protracted investigations that rarely culminate in meaningful sanctions or corrective measures.

The absence of decisive enforcement actions emboldens platforms to repeat and expand infringing practices, secure in the knowledge that financial penalties or reputational damage remain unlikely.

Finally, platforms exploit “dark patterns” manipulative user-interface designs engineered to prey on cognitive biases to nudge or trick consumers into behaviors they might otherwise avoid.

These deceptive interfaces employ techniques such as hidden opt-out checkboxes, misleading countdown timers, pre-ticked consent boxes for extensive data sharing, and convoluted workflows that compel users to subscribe to premium services or divulge sensitive information before they can complete seemingly innocuous tasks.

By steering users toward unwelcome subscriptions or excessive data disclosure, these dark patterns further erode consumer autonomy and contravene the spirit, if not the letter, of consumer and data protection laws.^[7]

Regulatory and Institutional Gaps

Three principal gaps emerge. First, the Competition Act lacks explicit provisions addressing digital-market specifics, such as algorithmic collusion, gatekeeper self-preferencing and data-access barriers.

Second, the Consumer Protection Act does not mandate plain-language disclosure of platform fees, ranking criteria or data-use practices, leaving consumers uninformed. Third, the Data Protection Act’s enforcement mechanisms are under-resourced: the Data Protection Commission lacks sufficient technical expertise to audit complex algorithms or large-scale data flows.^[8]

Cross-sector coordination is also weak: the Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (CCPC), Data Protection Commission (DPC)  and Ministry of Communications and Digitalization operate in silos, resulting in fragmented oversight.

Policy Recommendations

1. Amend the Competition Act 2010 to include a “digital markets” chapter defining “gatekeeper platforms” based on user numbers, transaction volume and data control. Explicitly prohibit self-preferencing algorithms and require interoperability with third-party services where gatekeeping behavior arises.^[9] Empower the CCPC to issue interim measures against suspected abuses pending full investigations.
2. Strengthen the Consumer Protection Act 2012 by mandating platforms to present fees, contract variations and data-use policies in clear, concise language prior to user acceptance.^[10] Introduce a “right to explanation” for algorithmic decisions affecting consumers, such as credit scoring or ranking placements, enabling users to contest adverse outcomes.
3. Enhance the Data Protection Act 2012 through secondary legislation requiring algorithmic-impact assessments for platform operators handling over a defined threshold of personal data.^[11] These assessments should evaluate risks to privacy, fairness and non-discrimination, with reports filed to the DPC for review.
4. Establish a Digital Platforms Regulatory Authority (DPRA) under presidential statute, consolidating functions from the CCPC, DPC and National Information Technology Agency (NITA). The DPRA would issue codes of conduct, oversee platform registration, audit compliance and impose graduated sanctions for violations. This model parallels the EU’s Digital Markets Act and United Kingdom’s proposed Digital Markets, Competition and Consumer Bill.^[12]
5. Mandate Data Portability and Open Standards to reduce data-lock-in. Platforms designated asexporters must implement standardized APIs to enable users and third-party developers to export or interoperate their data, fostering competitive entry and innovation.^[13]
6. Promote Multi-Stakeholder Engagement by convening a Digital Markets Advisory Council comprising government, civil society, academia, consumer associations and industry players. This council would guide policy development, monitor market trends and facilitate pilot projects on novel regulatory approaches.
7. Capacity Building and Technical Expertise: Allocate government funding for CCPC and DPC staff training in data science, machine learning and digital-economy economics. Partner with universities and international agencies to develop specialized curricula and secondment programs.^[14]

Implementation and Enforcement

Effective implementation of these reforms will rest squarely on strong political commitment and the strategic allocation of financial, human and technical resources. To that end, a clear, phased timetable should be adopted.

In the first twelve months, Parliament must enact targeted amendments to the Competition, Consumer Protection and Data Protection Acts explicitly defining gatekeeper platforms, algorithmic-transparency requirements and consumer-friendly contract standards.

By the eighteenth month, the Digital Platforms Regulatory Authority (DPRA) should be formally established via Executive Instrument, its governance framework agreed, and its core departments licensing, compliance, audits and enforcement staffed with qualified personnel.

Full operationalization of mandatory data-impact assessments, whereby major platforms submit algorithmic and privacy risk reports for regulatory review, should be achieved by the twenty-fourth month, giving the Data Protection Commission time to develop guidance notes and establish audit protocols.

Inter-agency cooperation will be critical throughout this timeline. Memoranda of Understanding between the Competition and Consumer Protection Commission, the Data Protection Commission and the National Information Technology Agency will codify procedures for information-sharing, joint investigations and coordinated enforcement sweeps against suspected abuses.

Within the DPRA, a dedicated Digital Markets Unit comprising economists skilled in market-power analysis, data scientists proficient in machine-learning diagnostics and legal experts versed in competition and consumer law will spearhead surveillance of platform conduct.

Leveraging advanced analytics tools, this unit can detect patterns of anti-competitive signaling, collusive pricing algorithms or opaque ranking manipulations in real time.

Public–private collaboration should be encouraged through “safe harbor” incentives: platforms that voluntarily adopt and demonstrate compliance with prescribed codes of conduct such as interoperable APIs, clear user-consent flows and periodic algorithmic audits would benefit from reduced penalty scales and expedited licensing processes.

Finally, a biennial policy review cycle, convening regulators, industry representatives, consumer groups and technical experts, will ensure that regulations remain responsive to emerging technologies, evolving business models and market feedback, allowing Ghana’s digital-economy governance to evolve in step with global best practices.

Conclusion

Digital platforms offer immense promise for Ghana’s economic development and consumer welfare. However, unchecked platform power risks entrenching anti-competitive practices and eroding consumer trust.

By modernizing competition, consumer-protection and data-privacy laws; creating a dedicated regulator; and fostering transparency, interoperability and stakeholder collaboration, Ghana can cultivate a balanced digital ecosystem that safeguards rights without stifling innovation.

This policy framework positions Ghana to lead in Africa’s digital economy, ensuring that digital platforms serve the public interest and contribute to inclusive, sustainable growth.

[1] OECD, The Digital Economy Outlook 2021 (OECD Publishing 2021) 45.

[2] Competition Act 2010 (Act 798) s 45.

[3] Consumer Protection Act 2012 (Act 747) s 17.

[4] Data Protection Act 2012 (Act 843) s 3.

[5] African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection (Malabo Convention) (adopted 27 June 2014, not yet in force).

[6] Joschka Wanner, ‘Algorithmic Collusion and Competition Law’ (2020) 43 World Competition 347.

[7] Dark Patterns Research Project, ‘Dark Patterns: User Manipulation in Websites and Apps’https://darkpatterns.org accessed 15 July 2025.

[8] Data Protection Commission (Ghana), Capacity Building Strategy (2022) 5.

[9] European Union, Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector (Digital Markets Act) OJ L 265/1.

[10] Consumer Protection Act 2012 (Act 747) s 5.

[11] Information Commissioner’s Office (UK), ‘AI auditing framework’(2021) 8–9.

[12] UK Government, ‘A new pro-competition regime for digital markets’ (Policy paper, 21 December 2023).

[13] Digital Markets Act (EU) arts 6–7.

[14] World Bank, ‘Building Digital Capacity in Africa: A Roadmap for Regulatory Agencies’(2024) 37–38.

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