Combating mobile money/digital fraud in Ghana: ‘Strategies for securing digital payments’

By Dr. Richmond Atuahene

1.0 Introduction/ Background

Globalization and digitization are two major trends that will shape the future of nations. Despite the many challenges associated with adapting to increasingly globalized markets and rapidly changing technologies. The evolving global financial landscape and the growing utilization of digital platforms have increased risks in the banking and telecom sectors and as such put combating financial fraud in focus.

Fraudsters are continuously developing sophisticated techniques and exploring vulnerabilities in the financial system to take advantage of unsuspecting customers, necessitating a proactive and comprehensive approach to combating fraud in the banking system.

Mobile network technology has exponentially advanced in the last decade and with this development, fraud activities have risen in equal measure resulting in companies and customers losing huge amounts of money as a result of, especially in developing economies like Ghana that lag in the regulatory frameworks when it comes to Mobile network fraud. Financial inclusion remains a core objective in Ghana.

Mobile money has brought millions into the formal financial system. Ghana’s leadership in mobile money has created significant economic opportunity Ghana has been trying to build one of the most advanced mobile money ecosystems in the Ecowas Sub region.  Digital payments are embedded in daily life, from small retail purchases to salary payments and government services.

Ghana is trying to lead West Africa in digital payment adoption, supported by strong mobile penetration and agent networks that reach both urban and rural communities. But this phenomenon is proving to be a double-edged sword. As digital volumes grow, fraud attempts have increased. Digital fraud cases have risen sharply, with the gaming sector alone recording fraud rates above 10%. Social engineering scams, SIM swap attacks and account takeover incidents are also becoming more common.

This shows that criminal networks are targeting mobile channels because transactions move quickly and customer onboarding is often remote. Mobile money interoperability and the growth of virtual cards have significantly expanded Ghana’s payment industry. MTN Ghana has made the largest contribution to DFI in Ghana, not only by introducing mobile money but also by providing the largest amount of coverage.

MTN Ghana also set up Mobile Money Limited, a subsidiary responsible for mobile financial services. With a market share of over 80 percent since 2017, MTN continues to dominate the mobile money market to date. The Ministry of Communications and Digitalization (MOCD) revealed in 2020 that MTN controlled 75 percent of the telecom market, labeling it a significant market power (SMP). The MOCD also revealed that MTN controlled about 94 percent of the mobile money market share, because the other telcos pay interconnect fees to MTN.

MTN’s SMP designation enables the National Communications Authority (NCA) to enforce the provisions of the Electronic Communications Act 2008, such as setting a price floor or ceiling for associated mobile money costs so as to maintain a competitive market and level the playing field for all telcos. Airtel Tigo, on the other hand, was the result of a merger to create a stronger telecommunications network.

However, in 2020, the parent companies of the entity opted to sell their shares to the government.⁴² Since the sale was completed in November 2021, it remains to be seen whether operating under the government’s management will be to Airtel Tigo’s detriment or success. The government’s previous failure to successfully manage the first government-owned telco, Ghana Telecom, resulted in the privatization of Ghana Telecom, which is now Vodafone Ghana.

Vodafone Ghana has also made efforts to increase financial inclusion by allowing Vodafone Cash users to send and deposit money without any charges since 2020. This initiative was made possible due to mobile money interoperability. Vodafone became the first player in the industry to introduce a free peer-to-peer service to enhance commercial advantage and allow for more financial inclusion. Customers can now move funds seamlessly between wallets, bank accounts and card products with minimal friction.

While this convenience strengthens financial inclusion and accelerates digital adoption, it also broadens the potential attack surface. Online shopping and digital lending have introduced further complexity. As ecommerce grows, card-not-present (CNP) transactions are becoming more common, creating greater opportunity for fraudsters to test stolen credentials across multiple platforms. Merchants and issuers with weaker controls are particularly vulnerable to these credential-stuffing and account takeover attempts.

Financial fraud and scams have become one of the most pressing threats to the financial sector and consumers in digital finance. Beyond direct monetary losses, fraud erodes consumer trust and risks reversing gains in financial inclusion. Finally, the increasing intersection between banking systems and external platforms, particularly mobile money and telecommunications networks, underscores the need for closer institutional collaboration. Fraud prevention can no longer be managed in isolation; it requires coordinated action across the broader financial ecosystem.

The rapid expansion of digital financial services, increased interoperability between banks, mobile money operators, and fintech platforms, and the growing sophistication of fraud techniques have collectively broadened the exposure of financial institutions to diverse and increasingly complex fraud typologies.

Mobile money and digital fraud in Ghana are primarily regulated through the Payment Systems and Services Act 2019 Act 987, the Cybersecurity Act 2020 Act 1038 and the Anti-Money Laundering Act 2020 Act 1044 which are enforced by the Bank of Ghana, the Cyber Security Authority, National Communication Authority and the Ministry of Communication.

A collaborative fraud control dashboard tracking platform has been established by the Government, the Bank of Ghana, and the Telcos Chambers that allow authorities to identify serial fraudsters, block fraudsters, block fraudulent devices and blacklist national ID numbers tied multiple fraud cases but mobile money and digital fraud still posed as a major challenge to both the players and regulators.

2.0 Brief Overview of Mobile Money and Digital Fraud in Ghana

Ghana’s digital financial services industry, most notably the market for mobile money services, has grown significantly during the pandemic. To achieve full digital financial inclusion, however, the country still must build capacity, skills, trust, and security. Mobile money (MoMo) is the bedrock of Ghana’s digital economy, but its massive growth has spawned a sophisticated ecosystem of digital fraud.

Criminals primarily rely on social engineering (psychological manipulation), such as pretending to be telco or bank agents to trick victims into sending funds, revealing their PINs, or approving fraudulent transactions. Digital and mobile money (MoMo) fraud in Ghana remains a significant cyber-security and financial threat, with overall financial sector fraud cases surging. The Bank of Ghana (BoG) records over 13,000 fraud incidents annually, with millions of cedis lost to scams that frequently leverage social engineering and digital platforms.  The scale of the threat had been the rising financial losses.

Cyber fraud losses have surged dramatically, with reported cases from the Cyber Security Authority (CSA) scaling from GH¢2.4 million to nearly GH¢15 million in a single year period. Combined sector fraud across banks and fintechs previously reached highs of GH¢88 million in a year. The Bank of Ghana (BoG) records thousands of electronic and MoMo fraud incidents annually. The digital economy’s shift away from brute-force hacking toward psychological deception means everyday users bear the brunt of these crimes. Analysis of the 2024 data showed that fraud heightened in fraudulent withdrawals from victims’ accounts, cyber/email fraud, and cash theft (cash suppression).

Another area of concern is SIM swap related fraud, where SIM numbers linked to banking accounts are fraudulently taken over and monies subsequently withdrawn from the accounts. This form of fraud targets individuals who have banking applications on their mobile phones and have linked their bank accounts to mobile money wallets collaboration into their operating models will be better positioned to protect customers without introducing friction. In Ghana’s high-velocity digital economy, trust is the currency that underpins adoption and safeguarding it will define the next phase of mobile-money success. Mobile money fraud continued to feature prominently in the Ghanaian financial ecosystem, but with a notable shift in approach.

In one striking case, a fraudster impersonated a bank staff member and contacted a branch directly, instructing a teller to process an urgent transfer. The request, delivered through what appeared to be an official communication channel, was executed without sufficient verification. Only after the transaction was completed did it become clear that the instruction was fraudulent. This incident illustrates how fraud is no longer limited to customers; bank staff themselves are increasingly being targeted through social engineering, exploiting authority, urgency, and internal communication channels.

According to Ghana Bankers Association industry fraud report for the period January to March 2026 Mobile Money fraud accounts for the highest number of cases (23 cases, 31.5%), making it the most operationally significant category. However, its financial impact is relatively low, with GHS 143,108 attempted and GHS 142,038 in net losses. This confirms that Mobile Money fraud is largely volume-driven, arising from social engineering, wallet compromises, and linkage vulnerabilities. While individual cases are small, the cumulative effect and the operational burden which is also substantial.

Categories such as Social Engineering (GHS 12,312.84 loss), Identity, Theft/Impersonation (GHS 24,433 loss), and USSD Fraud (GHS 7,019.50 loss) are relatively small in financial terms but are critical precursors and enablers of larger fraud schemes. They often represent the entry points through which fraudsters gain access to accounts or systems. Notably, Account Takeover and Manipulation of Accounts show partial recoveries (GHS 15,000 and GHS 62,700 respectively), suggesting that fraud involving identifiable actors or internal linkages offers better recovery prospects compared to anonymous digital fraud.

Digital channels, including mobile money, internet banking, and electronic banking, were heavily targeted. Seven successful cases totaling GHS768,787.95 were reported with no recoveries. This reflects a sector-wide trend where digital banking platforms are increasingly attractive to fraudsters, necessitating enhanced cybersecurity, transaction monitoring, multi-factor authentication, and customer education.

Digital channels also revealed operational blind spots. Fraudsters exploited SIM reissuance, stolen devices, and USSD channels to gain unauthorized account access and intercept OTPs. The reliance on SMS-based authentication created a systemic risk across the industry, as once compromised, customers’ entire financial identity could be exploited within minutes. The speed of fund movement — often through mobile wallets and agent points — further exposed the limitations of banks’ transaction monitoring systems, where real-time detection and blocking remain underdeveloped.

3.0 Dominant Mobile Money and Digital Fraud Typologies in Ghana

This occurs when fraudsters hijack a customer’s phone number by fraudulently transferring it to a new SIM card. They can then gain access to sensitive accounts and authentication mechanisms, like two-factor authentication (2FA) systems. SIM swap fraud is an account takeover attack where a scammer tricks your mobile service provider into transferring your phone number to a new SIM card under their control.

This allows the fraudster to intercept your incoming calls and text messages, including critical one-time passwords (OTPs) and 2FA codes. SIM-swap fraud is among Ghana’s most damaging scams. Attackers take over a user’s phone number (used as M- ID and banking username) by tricking or bribing a mobile agent to transfer the number to a new SIM. With control of the number, fraudsters reset OTPs/PINs and drain mobile money and linked bank accounts. SIM-swap fraud has cost Ghanaians millions of Cedis.

Tricking a cellular service provider into switching a victim’s service to a SIM card controlled by the fraudster (essentially hijacking the victim’s phone number). The main aim of SIM swapping is usually to exploit two-factor authentication to gain fraudulent access to bank accounts. This type of fraud involves employees of telcos and occurs in different forms. Employees can steal from customers’ mobile money wallets, transfer customers’ money unauthorized, collude with other fraudsters to swap SIM cards  , etc. It generally involves a telco employee manipulating a customer’s account without authorization.

• Social Engineering and Impersonation

In this type of fraud, callers impersonate legitimate organizations by manipulating caller ID information, tricking victims into revealing personal or financial information. This is the primary vector for MoMo fraud. Fraudsters typically impersonate telecommunications or bank officials, calling unsuspecting victims to request verification codes, PINs, or trick them into sending money under the guise of reversing a “wrong transaction” or claiming a prize. Scammers often impersonate trusted figures (bank agents, or Mobile money agents) via calls or spoofed SMS to trick users into revealing PINs/OTPs.

These phishing-style attacks exploit low tech barriers. Vishing and smishing is one of the specific modus operandi where fraudsters call or text (often via WhatsApps or SMS pretending to be telecom or bank agents tricking users into sending money, revealing their PINs or sharing OTPs. Cyber-email fraud refers to the act of tricking an email recipient into believing that the email was sent from the actual sender (authentic source).

Mobile Money Agent Fraud refers to deceptive or manipulative practices committed by or involving mobile money (MoMo) merchants and intermediaries. These agents abuse their position, manipulate transactions, or collude with external scammers to steal from customers or cheat the mobile network operators. Fraudsters can corrupt the large Mobile money agent network. Rogue agents may inflate withdrawal amounts, fake reversals, or collude with customers on fraudulent deals. Given Ghana’s ~thousand agents, this is a major vector for internal fraud

• Mobile Banking Account Takeover

A Mobile Banking Account Takeover is a form of identity theft where cybercriminals gain unauthorized control of your mobile banking app or online financial profile. Once inside, fraudsters can drain your funds, make unauthorized purchases, add payees, or even lock you out of your account entirely. This occurs when fraudsters hijack mobile banking apps linked to Mobile (via phishing, credential stuffing, or malware). Once inside, they quickly add new beneficiaries or initiate transfers. Malicious links are routinely distributed via SMS or WhatsApp, prompting users to click and submit their digital wallet or banking credentials

• Synthetic Identity Fraud at Onboarding

Synthetic identity fraud at onboarding is a financial crime where scammers combine real and fabricated data to create an entirely fictitious persona. During the registration process, fraudsters use these convincing fake identities to bypass Know Your Customer (KYC) and Anti-Money Laundering (AML) checks, opening accounts with no intention of paying. Increasingly, AI tools generate fake IDs and deep fake selfies to open mobile wallets under false identities. These synthetic accounts (often tier-1 KYC) become “mule accounts” for laundering fraud proceeds

• Agent Impersonation & Cash Suppression:

Agent impersonation and cash suppression are two distinct but highly prevalent financial crimes in Ghana that exploit the digital payment and banking sectors, often targeting customers and financial institutions. Fraudsters frequently target the extensive network of MoMo agents by posing as supervisors or creating fake merchant accounts to divert funds or manipulate transactions

Prompts are sent under the guise of a telco promotion and the recipient is asked to input their PIN as a verification measure to claim their “prize.” The fraudster gains access to the recipient’s mobile money account with the PIN that was inputted

Fraudsters pose as delivery companies and call customers under the pretext of delivering goods to them from relatives abroad. Customers will then be instructed to make a deposit to a mobile money account in exchange for delivering the goods

Telecommunications fraud is one of the most costly and complex challenges facing the industry today. With the global telecom sector processing trillions of transactions annually, the risks of fraud are growing both in terms of frequency and sophistication. Fraudsters have developed increasingly complex methods, from SIM swap fraud to international revenue share fraud (IRSF), call spoofing, and account takeovers. Traditional fraud detection systems—often rules-based and static—are struggling to keep pace. In contrast, anomaly detection powered by Artificial Intelligence (AI) has emerged as a game-changer.

4.0 Strategic Recommendations for Policy Direction for Banks and Mobile Network Operators

Banks and Fintech must build layered- strategies to combat mobile money and digital fraud in Ghana rely on a collaborative approach across technology, regulation, and consumer awareness. Because the majority of fraud stems from social engineering, the framework addresses both system vulnerabilities and human factors. Protecting these customers from fraud is critical to maintaining trust.

Many users rely on digital channels as their primary banking interface, meaning that a single successful scam can undermine confidence and reduce adoption. Combating digital and mobile money (MoMo) fraud in Ghana requires a multi-layered approach combining artificial intelligence (AI) and behavioral monitoring by financial institutions, strict regulatory frameworks by the Bank of Ghana, and vigilant habits like strictly protecting your PIN and OTPs.

Collaboration across the ecosystem will shape the future of Ghanaian payment security. Shared intelligence platforms and industry partnerships can improve early detection of coordinated fraud campaigns. Infrastructure providers play a central role by ensuring that data can be captured, analyzed and acted upon in real-time. As the ecosystem matures, the priority is no longer simply expanding access but strengthening resilience. Proactive, intelligence-led risk management must sit alongside inclusion efforts to ensure sustainable growth. Institutions that embed real-time monitoring, adaptive authentication and cross-industry. A strong and growing mobile money market community, which, in partnership with financial institutions, is supporting a digital revolution with innovative digital financial products and services

• Identity Assurance at Onboarding: Every wallet must open under a verified identity. Integrate with IPRS for real-time ID validation (national ID, passport). Use biometric liveness checks (e.g. selfie vs. ID photo) to deter fake accounts. Screen names against PEP and adverse-media lists. Youverify’s platform, for example, includes Kenya-specific IPRS connectivity and passive liveness options. Mobile operators and banks integrate with government databases like the Integrated Population Registration System (IPRS) to ensure strict Know-Your-Customer (KYC) compliance, heavily reducing identity theft during account onboarding
• Real-Time Transaction Risk Scoring:

Real-Time Transaction Risk Scoring is an automated fraud-detection method that evaluates payments in milliseconds. It assigns a numerical score to a transaction based on factors like behavior and location. Financial institutions use this score to instantly approve, block, or flag transactions for review. Every transaction (mobile banking) should be scored before completion. Key factors: deviation from the user’s normal behavior (30-day average), new device or location, recent SIM-swap, transaction size vs account age, etc. High-risk scores trigger alerts or blocks

iii. SIM-Swap Detection Integration: SIM-Swap Detection Integration is a security tool that allows applications and websites to verify if a user’s phone number has been moved to a new SIM card. By communicating directly with mobile carriers, it blocks fraudsters from hijacking your accounts with intercepted SMS two-factor authentication (2FA) codes. Before approving large transactions, query MNO APIs (MTN/Airtel/Telecel) about recent SIM changes for the phone number. If a swap occurred in the last 24–48 hours, flag or hold the payment for extra verification.

• Agent Network Anomaly Detection: Apply specialized monitoring for agent channels. Check each agent’s deposit/withdrawal patterns (velocity checks). Analyze network graphs to spot collusive sub-networks. Flag agents with unusually high cash-outs or repeated transaction reversals for compliance review. An Agent Network Anomaly Detection (Agentic NAD) system uses autonomous AI/software “agents” to monitor network traffic and devices. Instead of a single centralized program, distributed agents observe local traffic and communicate with each other to detect, share, and isolate cyber threats or performance issues in real-time
• Case Management and FRC Reporting: All fraud alerts and investigations should flow into a case-management system. This system tracks analyst reviews, evidence, and ensures Suspicious Transaction Reports are auto-generated in FRC format. It should enforce the 3-business-day STR filing SLA and keep audit trails for Bank of Ghana’s audits. Case Management is a coordinated process of assessing a client’s needs, planning, and connecting them to services. FRC Reporting can refer to multiple distinct regulatory or organizational functions, most notably
• Mobile Network Operators and financial institutions must increasingly leverage on AI to transition from basic rule-based security to behavioral analysis. This helps identify anomalous activities and intercept fraudulent communications before they reach users. AI adoption in Ghana’s financial and telecom sectors had evolved from merely being an extra security layer to a central, heavily regulated foundation for proactive defense. Institutions now view AI as an enterprise-wide necessity to combat heavily sophisticated, AI-driven fraud rather than just another optional tool.

AI‘s has the ability to process large volumes of data, identify complex patterns, and adapt to new threats is revolutionizing fraud prevention in telecom. AI Systems analyze a user’s “digital body language”—such as mouse movement speeds, typing rhythms, and mobile app navigation—to continuously verify identity and flag stolen credentials. AI engines (including predictive machine learning and Large Language Models) evaluate thousands of structured and unstructured data points to score the risk of a transaction in milliseconds, halting fraudulent wire transfers before funds move. Anti-Money Laundering (AML): AI Rather than blindly tracking arbitrary deposit sizes, banks use AI to model normal user accounts and catch unusual transaction chains associated with mule accounts or shell companies.

Telecom anomaly detection, in particular, focuses on identifying unusual or unexpected behaviors, which are often early indicators of fraud. By flagging these anomalies, AI enables telecom operators to prevent fraud before it escalates, safeguarding both their networks and their customers. Telecom operators and financial institutions are transitioning from basic rule-based security to AI-powered behavioral analysis.

By continuously profiling normal user patterns, this AI-driven approach identifies subtle, real-time anomalies to proactively thwart synthetic identities, deepfake-assisted scams, and coordinated fraud. Telecom operators and financial institutions are adopting AI to move from static, rule-based security to dynamic behavioral analysis. This shift allows systems to learn “normal” user behavior in real-time, instantly flagging subtle deviations that indicate fraud or cyber threats rather than just reacting to known patterns. AI could analyze billions of Call Detail Records (CDRs) and network signals in real-time.

It immediately flags abnormal routing patterns or coordinated SIM-swap/bypass fraud schemes. Providers are increasingly deploying AI tools to identify complex, coordinated attacks that might appear completely normal if viewed in isolation, protecting both network infrastructure and user data. AI-powered systems can analyze millions of data points in real time, providing instant alerts when suspicious activity is detected.

For example, machine learning models can track the behavior of individual subscribers, looking for anomalies such as an unusual number of high-cost international calls from a new location. In real-time monitoring, AI helps detect fraud early in the transaction lifecycle, minimizing losses and stopping fraudsters before they can cause significant damage. Machine Learning Models for Pattern Recognition. AI uses machine learning (ML) to recognize complex patterns and identify anomalies that might indicate fraud. Some of the most commonly used ML techniques for anomaly detection in telecom include:Neural Networks and Deep Learning: Neural networks can analyze massive, high-dimensional datasets, learning to recognize subtle anomalies that indicate fraud.

Deep learning models, in particular, excel in identifying patterns in call records, billing information, and network activity. Clustering Algorithms: Techniques like k-means clustering and DBSCAN group similar data points together and flag outliers as potential anomalies. For instance, a clustering algorithm might group together customers with similar calling habits, flagging any outliers who deviate from the norm as suspicious.

Autoencoders: A type of neural network, autoencoders are designed to detect anomalies by reconstructing input data. If a data point deviates too much from the expected output, the system recognizes it as an anomaly. Continuous Learning and Adaptation: One of AI’s most significant advantages in fraud detection is its ability to learn continuously.

Traditional fraud detection systems rely on static rules, but fraud tactics evolve rapidly. AI-powered systems, on the other hand, learn from new data and adjust their models to detect emerging fraud schemes. For instance, reinforcement learning can help AI systems adapt to new fraud patterns without human intervention. This continuous learning process ensures that the system remains effective even as fraudsters develop new tactics.

5.0 Strategic Recommendations for Policy Direction for Bank of Ghana and Other Regulators

A growing digital financial sector requires regulators and supervisors to develop regulation that is technology-neutral, device-agnostic, principles-based, and proportional to risk, creating a level playing field for all players. It also requires sufficient technical and supervisory capacity and a clear governance structure to ensure appropriate implementation of regulation. In this context, there is an opportunity to embrace regulatory technology (RegTech) and harness the power of data and technology to strengthen market oversight and customer recourse.

Bank of Ghana must design fraud compensation framework for banks and mobile network operators’ liability for security breaches, ensuring clear paths for customer recourse thus compelling service providers to maintain high encryption standards like in Kenya. Bank of Ghana (BoG) must adopt a formal digital fraud compensation framework Regulatory Alert. This will shift the liability onto financial providers and mobile network operators (MNOs) for internal security breaches Regulatory Alert. It mandates transparent recourse paths so that customers can recover funds lost to system vulnerabilities or unauthorized digital transactions.

Mobile Network Operators and Banks must be held directly accountable for security breaches occurring within their networks. Service providers must maintain high standards of identity verification and data encryption Regulatory Alert. Financial institutions and mobile money operators must be mandated to invest in high-standard identity verification and encryption. If unauthorized transactions occur due to internal system vulnerabilities, operators are liable and required to reimburse customers. Customers must report fraudulent transactions to their respective bank or mobile money provider.

Financial institutions are legally required to investigate and resolve or compensate valid claims within a stipulated timeframe (typically 30 days for digital credit providers). Bank of Ghana could model its framework on the Kenya’s fraud compensation framework comprises legal, regulatory, and institutional mechanisms across the financial and consumer sectors, managed primarily by the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) and the Competition Authority of Kenya (CAK). Bank of Ghana must establish a centralized framework for Banks, MNOs and fintech stakeholders to share threat intelligence and improve the speed of fund recovery for victims

• Bank of Ghana must ensure that banks and Mobile Network Operators enhance digital security and authentication protocols authentication protocols. Banks and Mobile Network operators must Implement stronger multi-factor authentication, transaction verification steps, and real-time alerts for high-risk channels such as E-Transfer, USSD, and Card-not-present transactions. Ghana must combat mobile and digital fraud through a multi-tiered approach robust system monitoring, strict customer due diligence (KYC), consumer awareness campaigns and possible Bank of Ghana’s fraud compensation framework.

This ecosystem should require Telecos and Banks to adopt dynamic authentication while ensuring strict data privacy like Kenya. The country must fight the growing telecoms and digital fraud using both technical and system, regulatory and institutional measures Bank of Ghana must adopt multi- layered strategies to combat mobile money and digital fraud in Ghana rely on a collaborative approach across technology, regulation, and consumer awareness. Because the majority of fraud stems from social engineering, the framework addresses both system vulnerabilities and human factors

• Bank of Ghana must ensure that Mobile Network Operators and Banks must adopt real-time monitoring by utilizing AI driven fraud detection to track transactions across mobile money, digital lending and bank accounts to automatically flags suspicious transactions. Financial institutions must be encouraged to adopt AI, machine learning, and behavioural analytics for early fraud detection. These technologies help identify suspicious activities and anomalies in real time, enabling a proactive approach to combating mobile money and digital fraud. Deploy advanced analytics and anomaly detection tools to identify unusual transaction patterns early, especially in digital and cross-channel transfers
• Bank of Ghana, Cyber Security Authority and National Communication Authority must ensure that Service Providers must tighten customer validation process by integrating biometric verification thus making it harder for criminals to create fake or forge accounts. To enhance security, institutions should implement blockchain solutions for document validation, helping to combat forgery and ensure authenticity. Additionally, multi-factor authentication and biometric verification should be strengthened across all platforms to provide an extra layer of protection against unauthorized access and fraud.
• e. Regulators like Bank of Ghana, Cyber Security Authority and NCA should ensure that Mobile Network operators and Banks must actively conduct public awareness campaigns to actively combat social engineering scams such as vishing-voice phishing- and smishing –(SMS phishing by constantly educating users on how to spot fraudulent messages. Providers continuously push safety campaigns advising users to protect their PINs, ignore pressure tactics, and avoid providing their phones to unverified agents. Scale continuous training for staff on emerging fraud typologies while also educating customers on social engineering, phishing, and credential protection risks.
• At the same time, regulatory expectations are changing. Supervisory bodies like Bank of Ghana must increasingly encourage continuous risk assessment rather than periodic compliance reviews. Detailed audit trails, transparent reporting and demonstrable governance frameworks are becoming baseline requirements in a market where transactions move in real-time
• Bank of Ghana must ensure that service providers must create reporting channels for consumers to report suspicious numbers, agent activities or fraudulent transactions directly to the Bank of Ghana Market Conduct Office/ Consumer Protection Office and Ghana National Communication Authority. Aggressive cross-sector intelligence sharing is promoted to quickly lock SIMs, block scam messages, and allow users to report fraud directly via dedicated Mobile channels.
• Bank of Ghana must collaborate with Cyber Security Authority, National Communication Authority and major telecoms like MTN, Airtel Tigo and Telecel on phone number masking. Collaborations between Bank of Ghana, National Communication Authority and major telecoms to prevent caller ID spoofing and protect against SIM swapping by masking like M-Pesa transaction numbers in Kenya. Improving collaboration and partnership is a key component of effective and efficient of Ghanaian digital financial ecosystem. The key regulatory and security issues raised by DFI relate to consumer protection, regulation of digital money and payment systems, cyber fraud policing, anti–money laundering efforts, and measures to counter financing of terrorism.⁷⁹

While the government continues to play a central role across a range of functions, including regulation, policymaking, and provision of digital infrastructure, effective directing of these issues will require multiple sectoral and stakeholder competencies, which necessitates effective partnership and collaboration. For example, activities across other sectors—such as sectoral computer emergency response efforts—should be aligned to government efforts.

This will require the Bank of Ghana, the National Communication Authority, Cyber Security Authority, market regulators, and other relevant authorities to cooperate toward ensuring security of DFS. While Ghanaian financial institutions and telcos continue to collaborate and invest in their sectoral CERTs, Ghanaian authorities must establish clear legal and regulatory standards and guidelines to ensure the safety and security of DFS and further enhance security cooperation among sectoral CERTs.

Public-private partnership is an imperative for cybersecurity initiatives according to Article 26 of the African Union Convention of Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection.⁸¹ Such partnership will further assist in identifying best practice initiatives. It is also important to create a support network to use expertise and resources to assist victims of digital financial fraud. The Bank of Ghana, along with the financial sector and telcos, must also link DFI and cybersecurity into its wider policy programs and make digital financial capacity building and security a core requirement for providers of financial services.

• Ghana’s digital financial ecosystem must enjoy increased cybersecurity enforcement to ensure resilience against digital technology–related risks: Cybersecurity is important to ensure digital financial inclusion. However, the interface between cybersecurity and economic viability remains a complex policy challenge. Domestic policies and regulations on cybersecurity should be enforced while paying due consideration to issues like Digital Financial Inclusion; for example, the cybersecurity of DFI is not stated as one of the pillars of the trailblazing Ghanaian Digital Financial Services Policy. This is notwithstanding the continued increase in reports of fraudsters targeting mobile money accounts; along with the loss of funds and data, privacy, and security breaches, these incidents risk diminishing trust in digital financial services.⁷⁸ Ghana’s digital financial policies ought to incorporate cybersecurity if they are to be effective in achieving their lofty goals.
• With the rapid expansion of mobile-phone banking in Ghana helping to bring financial services to unbanked communities, development efforts to advance infrastructure that will enable the functioning of digital systems should be a priority. Factors such as access to internet and electricity are key success determinants for enhancing digital financial inclusion. Many of Ghana’s financially excluded live in rural areas without access to internet, electricity, or systems that can function when offline, thereby compounding digital divides.

6.0 Conclusion

Digital payment fraud is a critical threat to Ghana’s financial inclusion gains. This document outlines actionable strategies to secure mobile money ecosystems through robust authentication, advanced threat detection, and shared intelligence. It serves as a comprehensive guide for telcos, regulators, and fintechs to mitigate risks and protect consumers.The fight against mobile and digital fraud in the financial sector is a shared responsibility of all well-meaning stakeholders and continued vigilance is vital as fraudsters continuously deploy new ways of defrauding victims through increased usage of sophisticated technology.

BOG must remain be committed to its oversight role to minimize the occurrence of mobile and digital fraud in the sector and must continue to collaborate with its key stakeholders like Cyber Security Authority, National Communication Authority, Banks and Mobile Network Operators in the fight against fraud. Tackling digital and mobile fraud is an ecosystem-wide responsibility requiring active participation from regulators, financial institutions, telecom operators, and end-users. With fraudsters increasingly using social engineering and advanced scams to manipulate victims, vigilance and cross-sector collaboration are critical to securing Ghana’s financial infrastructure.

Industry leaders (such as Mobile Money Fintech Ltd, MTN, Telecel, and AT) deploy real-time Artificial Intelligence and biometric monitoring to flag abnormal transaction patterns and block fraudulent agents.

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